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Abstract
We formulate a theory of expectation updating that fits the dynamics of accuracy
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tentive but, when updating, they follow Bayes’ rule and assign homogeneous weights to
public information. Our empirical findings suggest that agents do not herd and, despite
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1 Introduction
I see a critical need for basic research on expectations formation. Understand-
ing how persons update their expectations with receipt of new information often is
a prerequisite for credible use of econometric decision models to predict behavior.
Charles Manski, Econometrica 2004.
“Expectations matter. [....] Yet how those expectations are formed, and how
best to model this process, remains an open question.” Olivier Coibion and Yuriy
Gorodnichenko, AER 2015.
How do agents update their expectations about an economic variable? Are their updates
rational, in the sense of being consistent with Bayes’ rule? How heterogeneous are they? What
information do agents incorporate: publicly available data relevant to the variable, or do they
copy each other (“herding”)? During a crisis, do they stick to their models or are they will-
ing to discard them and allow for a paradigm shift? We answer these questions by analyzing
a previously unstudied dataset–Bloomberg’s ECFC survey of professional forecasters–and by
building a theory of expectation updating. Our theory fits remarkably well the dynamic evolu-
tion of both forecast accuracy and disagreement in the data and our empirical findings support
the following narrative: Agents use heterogeneous models to form an initial forecast and have
heterogeneous degrees of attention. Attentive agents update using Bayes’ rule and, rather than
herd, they incorporate public information about the forecasted variable, to which they attribute
homogeneous weights. In normal times, agents have high faith in their models but their faith
sharply decreases during crises. Although we do not explicitly model agents’ behaviour during
crises, our results support the hypothesis that during the 2008-2009 crisis agents discarded their
initial model and no longer updated using Bayes’ rule.
The ECFC survey dataset consist of a panel of approximately 75 professional forecasters
who forecast US annual (year-on-year) CPI inflation (among other variables) for the years 2007
to 2014 during the 18 months before the release of the figure. We thus analyze the updates of
fixed-event forecasts as the forecast horizon shrinks and more information becomes available.
The survey has some unique features that make it well-suited for answering the above questions:
participants can update their forecasts at any time and as often as they like and, upon logging
onto the terminal, they observe in real time the consensus and each others’ forecasts. The
period 2007-2014 is rather turbulent, as Figure 1 suggests, so forecasting US inflation is not a
trivial task.
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Figure 1: Annual US inflation 2007-2014
Our theory has three key elements: (i) not all agents update (some may be inattentive); (ii)
agents may use heterogeneous forecasting models that can differ from year to year but remain
fixed over the updating period (iii) agents who are attentive use Bayes’ rule to incorporate
public information and assign homogeneous weights to it. Figure 2 shows that our theory fits
remarkably well the dynamics of disagreement (standard deviation of forecasts across agents)
and of accuracy (Root Mean Squared Error, henceforth RMSE) in the data, except for the crisis
years 2008-2009:
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Figure 2: Fit of theory for disagreement (left) and RMSE (right)
The ingredients of our theory are motivated by the empirical regularities. First, agents in
our dataset are inattentive: Given that in the ECFC survey we observe the exact moment
updates occur, we can obtain an empirical proxy for attention. We find that on average only
about 40%-50% of agents update at least once a month and the frequency of updates varies
across agents and over the updating period, but is similar across years, including during the
crisis. Updaters (those who revised) are more accurate than non-updaters, and inattention can
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explain why consensus forecasts violate rationality tests. Allowing for inattention thus appears
to be an important ingredient when attempting to explain the patterns of accuracy in the data.
The second ingredient of our theory is motivated by the finding that inattention is not
enough to account for the disagreement in the data, since even agents who update at the
same time disagree. The fact that disagreement persists even towards the end of the calendar
year, when most of the forecasted variable has been observed, suggests that there are deep
idiosyncratic reasons why agents disagree: They could rely on different statistical models and/or
have different industry- or individual-specific incentives, career concerns, pessimism/optimism
biases, differences in private information, or different experience and skills. To capture these
dimensions of heterogeneity our theory allows agents to use heterogeneous models to produce
an initial forecast. It is important to stress here that what we call “model” is a reduced-form
way to capture both the fact that agents may use statistical models to produce a forecast as well
as apply judgmental or incentive-driven corrections. In other words, individual forecasts maybe
be biased for a number of different reasons that we don’t explicitly model. Because our theory
focuses on forecast updates, any individual-specific bias that is constant over the updating
period does not affect our analysis. Once we allow for heterogeneity in agents’ attention (which
can vary across agents and over time) and heterogeneity in agents’ models (which can vary
across agents and from year to year but remain constant during the updating period), our
theory postulates that agents respond homogeneously to the arrival of information.
The final ingredient of our theory is the assumption that, as new information arrives, agents
who are attentive update their previous forecast using Bayes’ rule. What information do agents
incorporate when they update? In reality, agents observe a variety of public but also private
signals: official statistics, news articles, central bank announcements and so forth. Among
these sources of information two stand out as the most relevant for annual inflation: 1. the
release of monthly CPI and 2. the forecasts of other agents. Monthly CPI is clearly something
that agents should pay attention to because it is a component of annual inflation, which is the
variable they are forecasting. Similarly, other agents’ forecasts as well as the consensus forecast
are relevant, since they may not only include public information, but also available private
information. Indeed, consensus forecasts from various surveys have been documented to be
remarkably accurate and are often used in policy, and more generally, in economic decision-
making. So what source of information–the monthly release of CPI or the consensus forecast–
fits the data better? Our dataset is uniquely suited to address this question, since agents can
observe the current consensus forecast at each moment they decide to update. In our baseline
theory we assume that information is related to monthly CPI. More precisely, agents use an
autoregressive model of order one (AR(1)) for year-on-year monthly inflation to produce an
initial forecast for annual inflation and, when updating, they use the same model to translate
the monthly CPI signal into a signal about annual inflation. The AR(1) model has agent-specific
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intercepts, which could capture heterogeneous beliefs across agents about the long-run mean
of inflation and/or any other agent-specific bias or forecast correction that remains constant
over the updating period. We also consider a variation of the theory where information is the
consensus forecast (agents “herd”).
Structural estimation of our theory shows that the version where agents herd does not
fit the data well, whereas the baseline theory where information is the monthly release of
CPI fits remarkably well the observed dynamics of both accuracy and disagreement in normal
times. Focusing on the baseline theory, we obtain estimates of the structural parameters, which
include a parameter capturing agents’ “faith” in their model.1 We find that in normal times
agents place high faith in their model, even though it may produce quite distinct forecasts
compared to others. However, agents’s faith drops dramatically during the crisis years 2008-
2009 and our theory has trouble fitting the dynamics of disagreement and accuracy (see Figure
2). Interestingly, for the crisis years the ECFC agents are, for the most part, more accurate
than our theory would have predicted. A possible explanation for this finding is that our theory
assumes that agents use the same model over the updating period but this is a bad idea during
a turmoil since there is often a paradigm shift. The fact that in the data the initial forecasts for
the crisis years are highly inaccurate but their accuracy improves sharply during the forecasting
period suggests that agents in our sample may have discarded their initial model for a new one
and thus obtained a dramatic improvement in accuracy. Our theory does not allow for such
model-shifting during the updating period. Still, our empirical estimates succeed in capturing
this paradigm shift by showing that agents’ “faith” in their model decreases from 199.42 for
2007 to 0.0001 for 2008!2
By estimating a number of variations of our baseline theory we assess the relative importance
of its key ingredients. We find that heterogeneity in models is crucial, as eliminating this source
of heterogeneity would worsen the fit of our theory over all years by 156% for disagreement and
by 4% for accuracy. In contrast, by eliminating inattention the fit of our theory would decrease
by 37% for disagreement and by 15% for accuracy (see Table 4).
To evaluate how our theory fares compared to existing theories of information rigidities, we
estimate some leading alternative theories using our new data. For normal years the fit of our
theory is better than that of Mankiw and Reis (2002)’s “sticky information” theory (whose fit is
worse by 581.6% for disagreement and 162.3% for accuracy), Sims (2003)’s “noisy information”
theory (whose fit is worse by 117.4% for disagreement and 12.7% for accuracy), Andrade and
1Formally, “faith” is the precision of the initial forecast (inverse of the variance), assumed to be constant
across agents.
2The paradigm shift we suspect is consistent with the findings of Bassetto, Messer and Ostrowski (2013)
who show that “the recovery of inflation in 2009/2010 occurred precisely at the only time (since 1985) in which
the statistical models considered here would predict sharp disinflation, that is, inflation went up at the time at
which the models would most strongly predict that it should go down.”
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Le Bihan (2013)’s “sticky-noisy” theory (whose fit is worse by 61.8% for disagreement and
35.1% for accuracy) and Patton and Timmermann (2010)’s “long-run means” theory (whose fit
is worse by 114.5% for disagreement and 30.9% for accuracy).3
For the crisis years, the fit of our theory remains better than that of alternative theories,
apart from two instances: The first is Andrade and Le Bihan (2013)’s “sticky-noisy” theory,
which fits disagreement and accuracy better (it outperforms ours by 21.6% and 14.8%, respec-
tively). The reason for this is that our theory assumes that agents’ models do not change
over the updating period and this is what drives the disagreement. In Andrade and Le Bihan
(2013)’s “sticky-noisy” theory the disagreement is driven by the noise in the information, which
varies over time. The second is Patton and Timmermann (2010)’s “long-run means” theory,
which fits better than ours for both accuracy and disagreement (it outperforms our theory by
38.7% and by 40.6% respectively). The key difference between our baseline and Patton and
Timmermann (2010)’s theory (besides the fact that our theory has inattention and their theory
has noisy information) is that they assume that agents assign ad-hoc (data-driven) weights to
information, so agents in their theory do not follow Bayes’ rule. This difference in fit suggests
that Bayesian updating fits remarkably well in normal times, while not that well during the
crisis when, perhaps, agents do not have adequate estimates about the precision of their in-
formation nor of their previous forecast. Remarkably, as we already noted, our theory with
Bayesian updating fits better than Patton and Timmermann (2010)’s theory both accuracy
and disagreement during non-crisis years despite the fact that Patton and Timmermann (2010)
choose the weights to ex-post rationalize the data.
Summing up, the structural estimation of our theory, as well as the fit comparisons with
alternative theories support the following conclusion: In normal times, agents place high faith in
the heterogeneous models they used to produce their initial forecast. When agents are attentive,
they update their forecast by incorporating information directly linked to the forecasted variable
using Bayes’ rule and assign homogeneous weights to it. During crises, agents lose faith in their
initial model and no longer behave like Bayesians.
This paper is related to several theoretical and empirical literatures in economics: the
literature on expectation formation (rational and behavioural), the literature that highlights
the importance of information rigidities in expectations, and the literature on social learning.
Our main contribution to the first two strands is to provide a simple theory that fits the
dynamics of both accuracy and disagreement in the data while remaining within the confines
of a rational theory with Bayesian learning, something that no existing theory has been able to
accomplish so far. Lucas (1972) and Kydland and Prescott (1982), emphasize the presence of
information frictions as a constraint faced by agents. The existence of these frictions prevents
3See Table 6
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agents from observing or acquiring all the relevant information when making their decisions.
While the full-information rational expectations (FIRE) hypothesis cannot be reconciled with
the stylized facts in survey data, information rigidities can explain why the consensus forecast
violates the FIRE hypothesis. The presence of these rigidities is backed by ample empirical
evidence: Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) document the existence of information rigidities
in survey data leveraging shocks and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) propose an empirical
specification to quantify these rigidities.
A further contribution to the literature on information rigidities is that we show that inatten-
tion is important in explaining the data, whereas (at least for inflation expectations) assuming
that agents observe noisy signals is not empirically relevant. The theoretical foundations of
inattention are in the seminal works by Sims (2003), Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Reis (2006).
The empirical performance of these theories is investigated by Andrade and Le Bihan (2013)
and Andrade, Crump, Eusepi and Moench (2014). Our theory builds on the theoretical under-
pinnings of this empirical work and, in addition to inattention, it incorporates the possibility
that agents have heterogeneous models, a feature that was found to be important by Patton and
Timmermann (2010) and Lahiri and Sheng (2008) in explaining disagreement in survey data.
Patton and Timmermann (2010) is the first contribution that formalises a theory of forecast
formation with heterogeneous priors, but, in contrast to this paper, it does so using an ad-hoc
behavioural learning rule. Our empirical results support their finding that heterogeneity in
the initial forecasts is a crucial ingredient of a theory that can fit forecast disagreement. Our
theory in addition shows the importance of accounting for inattention and, remarkably, it fits
the dynamics of both disagreement and accuracy while maintaining Bayesian learning. It is
also worth mentioning an early empirical contribution by Caskey (1985), who builds a Bayesian
learning model that matches the mean Livingston forecasts from 1958-1982. Compared to this
paper, we match the observed dynamics of accuracy and disagreement of forecast updates.
Two key features of our theory that set it apart from previous contributions is that, once we
account for inattention and heterogeneous models, our agents use Bayesian learning and behave
in a homogeneous fashion. These features are in apparent contrast with Manzan (2011) and
Lahiri and Sheng (2008), who, respectively, show that professional forecasters violate Bayesian
learning and that heterogeneous weights on information are needed to match the disagreement
in the data. We can reconcile these findings by noting that in our theory agents are inattentive
and that only attentive agents are Bayesian.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate what source of information agents
use by empirically evaluating whether information relevant to the variable or herding fits better
the observed patterns of accuracy and disagreement. Our findings suggest that agents trust
their models and do not copy each other despite the fact that in our survey it is easy to do so.
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This result is in contrast with other social or professional settings where agents tend to copy
each other (see, e.g., the seminal contribution Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents
stylized facts about forecast updates and their relationship with accuracy and disagreement.
Section 4 describes our theory of expectation formation. The structural estimation and fit of
our theory is described in Section 5. In Section 6 we investigate whether agents are herding
by building and structurally estimating a variation of our theory where updaters pay attention
to the consensus forecast. A number of further variations of the baseline theory (homogeneous
models, full attention, noisy information, non-Bayesian learning) are described and estimated in
Section 7. In Section 8 we briefly describe a number of leading theories of dynamic expectation
formation with rigidities, estimate them and compare their fit to that of our baseline theory.
Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 The dataset: Bloomberg’s ECFC survey
This paper analyzes updates of US annual (year-on-year) CPI inflation forecasts from a new
dataset: the “Economic Forecasts ECFC” survey of professional forecasters conducted by
Bloomberg. Users of the Bloomberg terminal can access it at any point in time (see Fig-
ure 3). Each forecast on the screen is associated with the name of the forecaster’s institution
as well as with the date of the last forecast update. For example, the screen shot on the 6th of
May 2015 shows that Barclays last updated their forecast on May 1st. The screen also displays
in the first row the consensus forecast updated in real time. To the best of our knowledge we
are the first to analyze this survey.
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Figure 3: Bloomberg EFCF survey: a snapshot
Participants: A comparative overview of the ECFC survey with respect to other surveys
of professional forecasters considered in the literature is provided in Table 1. The table shows
that although the composition of the participants is comparable to other surveys the number
of participants is larger, updates can happen anytime, and the most recent forecasts of other
agents are visible to the participants at any point in time. Participants are based in different
countries and can be divided into three main categories: financial institutions (private banks,
investment institutions and large global investment banks), economic consulting firms, and a
mixed group formed by others such as universities, research centers and governmental agencies.
On average, the percentage of participants from financial institutions is higher for ECFC and
Blue Chip surveys, reaching 60%. The percentage of economic consulting firms is relatively in
line with other surveys at 26%, while the number of universities, research centers and other
types of organizations is lower (14%) compared to the US SPF, Consensus Forecasts, Livingston
and the ECB’s SPF.
Forecasts: We focus on fixed-event forecasts of annual US inflation. For each year, we
consider the subset of agents who provide a forecast 18 months before the end of the year.
9
Table 1: Common Surveys of Professional Forecasters
US SPF Blue Chip Consensus Livingston ECB SPF HM Treasury ECFC
Frequency Q M M Semi-annual Q M Anytime
Participants 45 50 45 45 60 40 75
Anonymity X × × X X × ×
Observability × × × × × × X
of consensus
Financial Inst. 37% 64% 49% 50% 49% 52% 60%
Economic Cons. 29% 26% 24% 21% 22% 32% 26%
Univs. & Gov. 34% 10% 27% 29% 29% 16% 14%
For instance, for 2014 annual inflation, our sample contains the agents who start forecasting
in July of 2013. The only exceptions are the initial years of the survey, 2007 and 2008, for
which the initial forecasts were provided 13 months and 16 months before the end of the year,
respectively (for simplicity, in the remainder of the paper we will not make this distinction
explicit). Our dataset contains the full history of forecast updates for all agents during the 18
months before the end of each year. Updates in the ECFC are irregularly spaced and more
frequent than in other surveys, however they are not frequent enough to allow us to conduct
the analysis at a daily or weekly frequency since there are few updates in any given week. We
therefore analyze updates at the monthly frequency and consider the forecasts available on the
terminal the last day of each month. This is motivated by the fact that our baseline theory
assumes that forecast updates take into account the release of monthly CPI–which typically
occurs around the 20th of the month–so sampling the forecasts at the end of the month ensures
that this piece of information is in the agents’ information set. For each agent we, therefore,
have a sequence of 18 forecasts for each year. We index the horizon backwards, so for a given
year the index h = 18, ..., 1 indicates that the forecast was produced h months before the end
of the corresponding year.
Reward structure and incentives: Based on the information provided by Bloomberg
in private communications, participants are not explicitly rewarded nor ranked based on their
accuracy. Active participants are, however, more likely to be cited in survey-related Bloomberg
news stories and newsletters. The fact that forecasts are not anonymous could provide a larger
incentive for accuracy compared to other surveys (Table 1).
Survey availability and uses: The survey is available on the Bloomberg terminals. In
addition, its main results are divulged and published by Bloomberg in various newsletters, re-
ports and media outlets such as the monthly Bloomberg Briefs Economics Newsletter that are
available to a broad array of users. Bloomberg collects data on the number of hits ECFC gets
and on the number of users that subscribe to ECFC-related publications, but does not make
this data publicly available.
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3 Stylized Facts
Fact 1: Agents are inattentive: Figure 4 plots the proportion of agents that updated (changed
their forecast) at each horizon and year in our sample. On average, 40% to 50% of participants
update at least once a month, which is in line with the figures in Dovern (2013) for the monthly
Consensus Economics survey and slightly below the 60% to 70% documented by Andrade and
Le Bihan (2013) for the survey of the ECB, which is quarterly. Notice that the proportion of
updaters varies within a year but does not change dramatically between crisis (2008-2009) and
other years. On average over all years 44% of agents revise each month, whereas this number
goes to up to 49% during the crisis.
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Figure 4: Monthly updating frequencies
The frequency with which agents update their forecast provides an empirical proxy for attention.
Our historical dataset does not contain the time-stamps of when each forecast was submitted,
so we can tell that a forecaster logged in the system only when she decided to change her
forecast. Because the absence of an update could be also due to the decision not to revise the
forecast after acquiring new information, our empirical measure can be viewed as a lower bound
for attention.
In order to measure attention we construct an indicator variable capturing whether agent i
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updated her previous forecast h months before the end of the year:
ri,h =
1 if ŷi,h 6= ŷi,h+10 otherwise (1)
where ŷi,h is agent i’s forecast of annual inflation for a given year measured on the last day of
month h and ŷi,h+1 is her forecast measured on the last day of the previous month (h+ 1). We
compute this indicator for each year 2007, . . . , 2014 and for h = 17, . . . , 1. Then, each month
the set of updaters consists of the agents for which ri,h = 1.
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Figure 5: RMSE: average across years
Fact 2: Attention improves accuracy: Figure 5 presents the evolution of the Root Mean
Square Error as the horizon shrinks from h = 18 to h = 0, averaged across the years 2007-
2014. This measure is constructed using the consensus forecast separately for updaters and
non-updaters at each forecast horizon and comparing it with the actual realization of annual
inflation. As expected, as the forecast horizon is reduced, the accuracy of both groups improves
since relevant new information accumulates over time. However, updaters are uniformly more
accurate than non-updaters.4
Fact 3: Inattention can explain violations of Full Information Rational Expectations (FIRE):
We now test whether the rationality of the consensus forecast for each horizon differs between
updaters and non-updaters. As the time series dimension only includes eight observations for
4Note that since in our sample all agents give a forecast at h = 18 the two lines coincide at horizon h = 18.
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each horizon, the results of the tests should be interpreted with due caution. As standard, the
idea is to test for predictability of forecast errors by a “Mincer-Zarnowitz” (MZ) regression:
y = α + βy¯h + , (2)
where y is the realization of annual inflation for a given year and y¯h is the consensus forecast
produced h months before the end of the year for each group (updaters, non-updaters). The
consensus forecast is unbiased if α = 0 and it is rational if α = 0 and β = 1. Table 2 reports the
p-values for the test of the aforementioned two hypotheses obtained by estimating regression (2)
for each h separately across different years and considering HAC standard errors constructed
using the Bartlett Kernel. The first two columns of Table 2 present the results using all
participants, while the remaining columns reports the results for updaters and non-updaters.
Table 2: P-values of bias and rationality (MZ) tests for consensus forecast
All Sample Updaters Non-Updaters
Horizon Bias MZ Bias MZ Bias MZ
1 0.549 0.0000 0.577 0.1737 0.082 0.0000
2 0.611 0.0004 0.200 0.3365 0.102 0.0007
3 0.159 0.0946 0.211 0.0070 0.161 0.3825
4 0.241 0.5316 0.486 0.1614 0.227 0.3541
5 0.195 0.4158 0.295 0.0668 0.214 0.0628
6 0.238 0.4842 0.262 0.3406 0.269 0.2110
7 0.199 0.2420 0.513 0.1341 0.325 0.0053
8 0.602 0.1015 0.139 0.2957 0.708 0.0471
9 0.986 0.1204 0.574 0.6848 0.667 0.0069
10 0.855 0.0170 0.920 0.5145 0.681 0.0002
11 0.606 0.0041 0.701 0.4991 0.511 0.0003
12 0.336 0.1490 0.224 0.4697 0.558 0.1093
13 0.432 0.1214 0.199 0.4374 0.957 0.0779
14 0.888 0.2761 0.683 0.0696 0.498 0.7969
15 0.626 0.8849 0.772 0.7611 0.55 0.6798
16 0.589 0.0614 0.630 0.5078 0.543 0.0215
17 0.394 0.0000 0.435 0.0001 0.367 0.0001
18 0.379 0.0000 0.370 0.0000 0.85 0.0001
The results confirm previously established findings in the literature (Pesaran and Weale
(2006)) that the consensus based on all agents (updaters and non-updaters) fails rationality tests
at different horizons. Attention can, partly, explain such finding, as the consensus forecast for
updaters does not violate rationality for the majority of forecast horizons, whereas the consensus
forecast for non-updaters violates rationality for most horizons.
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Fact 4: Attention differences cannot fully account for disagreement: Consistent with other
surveys, there is large disagreement in the forecasts at all horizons (measured by the standard
deviation of individual forecasts) not only for the entire cross-section of participants, but also
when considering updaters. Figure 6 shows the evolution of disagreement at each forecast
horizon, averaged across the years 2007-2014.
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Figure 6: Disagreement: average across years
As expected, the dispersion of predictions decreases as the forecast horizon decreases, which
is consistent with the fact that more information about annual inflation accumulates as the
release date draws near. Updaters disagree less than non-updaters uniformly at all horizons
but their disagreement is never zero. This implies that heterogeneity in attention is not enough
to explain the persistent disagreement among agents. There could be many other reasons why
attentive agents disagree: they use heterogeneous forecasting models, have different incentives
(e.g. industry or individual-specific incentives), display pessimism or optimism biases, or have
access to different sources information or experience/skills. In the following section, we build
a theory where we endow agents with heterogeneous models. The notion of “model” in our
theory is a reduced-form way to capture any of these dimensions of heterogeneity so long as
they are time-invariant.
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4 A Theory of Expectation Updating
We now build a rational theory of expectation updating and later establish that it fits remark-
ably well the observed dynamics of disagreement and accuracy in the data. The theory has
three key features: i) heterogeneity in models, ii) inattention and iii) Bayesian updating for
attentive agents. We refer to this version of the theory as “baseline.”
Heterogeneous Models: We assume that there is a population of “models”. A model
describes any procedure that an agent follows to produce a forecast such as running a statistical
package, discussing with colleagues or applying any judgemental corrections to the forecasts
produced by his software. Each model gives normally distributed forecasts with mean µi and
precision ai,18 as follows: N
(
µi, a
−1
i,18
)
. The population of models is described by a normal
N
(
µ, σ2µ
)
, so each µi is drawn from this distribution. Heterogeneity is captured by the fact
that the mean µi is agent-specific. However, we assume that all agents assign the same precision
ai,18 = a18 so, in other words, they trust their methods is the same way. The precision a18 is a
key parameter in our theory as it captures agents’ “faith” in their model.
Initial Forecast: All agents start forecasting inflation for a given year 18 months before
the end of that year.5 At that point, each agent draws a µi out of the population, and her
initial forecast is ŷi,18 = µi. Note that an implication of our assumptions is that agents can
change the model from year to year but they keep it constant during the 18 months forecasting
period.
Updates and Inattention: At each subsequent month h = 17, ..., 1 a fraction 1 − λh of
agents update their forecast. The key assumption is that the fraction of updaters 1 − λh is
exogenous and known (we set it equal to the observed frequency of updates depicted in Figure
4). Let Ih denote the set of updaters at time h.
Information Arrival and Bayesian Updating: Let y denote the true inflation for the
year under consideration. Updaters observe a public signal zi,h about y with precision bi,h :
zi,h = y + εi,h,
εi,h ∼ N(0, b−1i,h),
and use Bayes’ rule to update their forecast. Normality and Bayes’ rule imply that the updated
forecast is a linear combination of the previous forecast and the public signal where the weight
on public informations is determined by the relative precision of the signal and the previous
forecast. Thus, the forecast for the attentive agent i at month h - i.e., for i ∈ Ih - is a normal
5Since we are describing the procedure for a specific year, we do not explicit index the calendar year.
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N(ŷi,h, a
−1
i,h) with
ŷi,h = (1− wi,h)ŷi,h+1 + wi,hzi,h (3)
ai,h = ai,h+1 + bi,h = a18 +
17∑
j=h
bi,h. (4)
The weight on the public signal is
wi,h ≡ bi,h
ai,h+1 + bi,h
=
bi,h
a18 +
∑17
j=h bi,h.
. (5)
The forecast for non-attentive agents is the previous month’s forecast, ŷi,h = ŷi,h+1.
Public signal: What source of public information do agents use when updating? In reality,
there is a variety of publicly, but also privately, observed signals that may induce a forecaster
to update: official statistics, news articles, central bank announcements and so forth. Among
those sources of information the release of monthly CPI is particularly relevant since it can
be used to construct year-on-year monthly inflation xh, from which we can obtain a measure
of annual inflation. This is clearly something that agents should pay attention to, since, from
h = 11, . . . , 1 it is (roughly) 1/12 of the variable they are forecasting. In what follows, we
assume that the public signal is monthly CPI. Assuming that agents use only this signal and
no additional information turns out to fit the data very well.
Agents use the current month’s CPI to calculate year-on-year monthly inflation xh, defined
as
xh =
1
12
(
cpih − cpih+12
cpih+12
)
,∀h = 11, . . . , 0. (6)
They, then, employ their model to obtain a signal for annual inflation. Because annual inflation
can be approximated by the sum of year-on-year monthly inflation:6 y ∼= ∑11h=0 xh, a model for
xh implies a model for y.
We assume that agents use an AR(1) model for year-on-year monthly inflation to translate
xh into a signal for annual inflation:
xh = ci + φxh+1 + vh, (7)
with
vh ∼ N(0, σ2v).
Note that we assume that the model for year-on-year monthly inflation has heterogeneous
intercepts across agents. This, in turn, implies heterogeneous unconditional means of annual
6Annual inflation, e.g. for year 2007, is y = (cpi2007− cpi2006)/cpi2006 where cpi2007 = 112
∑11
j=0 cpij and cpij
is the Consumer Price Index measured j months before the end of year 2007
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inflation: µi ≡ 12
(
ci
1−φ
)
. The annual signal zi,h is the model-implied conditional mean of y
based on the information set available at month h, zi,h = E[y|xh, xh+1, ...]:
zi,h = µi +
φh−11(1− φ12)
1− φ (xh − ci/(1− φ)) for h = 17, . . . , 12 (8)
zi,h =
h
12
µi +
φ(1− φh)
1− φ (xh − ci/(1− φ)) +
11∑
j=h
xj for h = 11, . . . , 1. (9)
The signal’s precision is the inverse of the variance of the error ei,h = y−zi,h. Heterogeneity
is only in the means (and so in zi,h), so the precision bh is the same across agents and it is a
known function of φ and σ2v :
b−1h =

σ2v
(1−φ)2
[
12− 2φ(1−φ12)
1−φ +
φ2(1−φ24)
1−φ2
]
+ φ
2(1−φ12)2(1−φ2h−24)
(1−φ)3(1+φ) σ
2
v if h ≥ 12
σ2v
(1−φ)2
(
h− 2φ(1−φh)
1−φ +
φ2(1−φ2h)
1−φ2
)
if h ≤ 11.
(10)
Full details about the derivations of zi,h and bh can be found in Appendix A.
For coherence, we assume that agents use the same model to interpret the monthly signal
and to generate the initial forecast. We further assume that agent i’s initial forecast at h = 18,
ŷi,18, is the unconditional mean of annual inflation implied by the AR(1) model for year-on-year
monthly inflation, that is, µi ≡ 12
(
ci
1−φ
)
. The latter assumption is motivated by the fact that
the unconditional mean is the optimal forecast (for a quadratic loss) for any mean-reverting
process at long horizons. In order to obtain a distribution across agents for µi: µi ∼ N(µ, σ2µ)
we assume that ci ∼ N(c, σ2c ), so that µ = 12 c1−φ and σµ = 12 σc1−φ .
Homogeneous weight on signal: An implication of our assumptions is that when agents
update they assign homogeneous weight on the public signal. To see this, note that the signal’s
precision in equation (4) only depends on common parameters and the initial precision a18 is
assumed to be constant across agents, so the weight on public information in (3) is homogeneous
across agents:
wh =
bh
a18 +
∑17
j=h bj
. (11)
In conclusion, given that all attentive agents attach the same weight to information, the only
sources of heterogeneity in our theory are heterogeneity in attention and heterogeneity in the
long-run mean of inflation implied by agents’ models.
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5 Structural Estimation of Baseline Theory and Results
In this section we describe the structural estimation of our theory. In Sections 6 and 7 we use
the same procedure to estimate a number of alternative specifications. These exercises allow
us not only to establish the superiority of this baseline specification but also to get a sense of
the relative contribution of each feature of the theory to the model’s fit.
We seek to estimate the following parameters θ = (λh, φ, σ
2
v , µ, σ
2
µ, a18) in order to get the
theoretically predicted RMSE and disagreement to be as close as possible to their empirical
counterparts.
We compute the disagreement and RMSE implied by the theory as follows: For a given year,
we draw the initial forecasts for 75 agents from a N(µ, σ2µ). For horizon h = 17, we randomly
draw a fraction 1 − λh of agents, where 1 − λh is the proportion of updaters observed in the
data at horizon h for that year. The forecast for the non-updaters equals the initial forecast.
The forecast for the updaters is obtained using equations (3)-(5) where the public signal zi,h is
derived using equations (8) and (9), xh is year-on-year monthly inflation (given by (6)) for that
year and horizon, computed using data from FRED.7 The public signal’s precision is given by
(10). We repeat the same procedure for each of the subsequent horizons h = 16, ..., 1, where
now the forecast for a non-updater at horizon h is equal to his forecast at horizon h+1. At each
horizon h, we use the simulated forecasts to compute the disagreement across all agents and the
RMSE for the consensus forecast. The RMSE is calculated by comparing the consensus forecast
to the realization of annual inflation for the year under consideration. We repeat the simulation
for τ = 100 replicas for each year, which overall yields τT different series for disagreement and
accuracy, where T = 8 years.8
We estimate the structural parameters by Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) as in
Gourieroux and Monfort (1996), Duffie and Singleton (1993), Ruge-Murcia (2012), which
amounts to matching empirical moments with their theory-implied counterparts. Based on
the evidence studying the small sample bias of GMM estimators with a large number of mo-
ment conditions discussed in, e.g., Tauchen (1986) and Altonji and Segal (1996), we restrict
attention to a subset of horizons h = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 18. The chosen moments are the
disagreement and RMSE at different horizons h, delivering a total of 18 moments. We provide
some further details of the estimation procedure in Appendix B.
7The data corresponds to the historical series of the Consumer Price Index for all items. Available at:
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIAUCSL
8Although the choice of the number of replications (τ) is arbitrary, following Duffie and Singleton (1993),
the idea is to have a simulation sample, τT , generated for a sample size of T years, where τT →∞ as T →∞.
Moreover, as stressed by Gourieroux and Monfort (1996), when the number of replications tends to infinity, the
SMM estimator coincides with GMM.
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We start by describing the estimated parameters and discuss the findings and proceed with
a number of figures that illustrate the theory’s fit of the data. Table 3 presents all the estimated
parameters. The first part of the table contains the estimated parameters when moments are
averaged over all years (2007-2014), then over only crisis years (2008-2009) and finally over all
years excluding the crisis years, referred to as non-crisis years. We also separately estimate
parameters for each year (using the exact number of total agents in each year) and present
those in the second part of the table. The AR(1) coefficient ρ and the precision a18 of the
initial forecast are almost always significant. The noise attached to the public signal (σv) is
significant for several years and particularly higher during the crisis years, in line with the
results in Nimark (2014). The results also suggest that the initial forecast precision parameter
a18, measuring forecaster’s faith in their model, is large and significant in all years, but drops
dramatically during the years of the crisis. Finally, from the estimated φ, ci and σc we calculate
the long-run mean (µ, σµ) depicted in Figure 8. The last column of Table 3 reports the p-values
of the test of over-identified restrictions (J-Test).
Figure 7 presents the fit of the baseline theory for both disagreement and accuracy. Again,
following the sequence described above, we first illustrate the fit over the entire sample, then
we focus on crisis years 2008-2009 and, finally, present the results for non-crisis years. We see
that the fit is much better for non-crisis years. Disagreement is higher during crises than for
normal years. Although the disagreement starts at similar levels in both crisis and non crisis
years, its behaviour during the forecast horizon is completely different. While for the non-
crisis years disagreement always decreases, during the crisis it goes up, reaching a maximum at
the 11 months horizon, and then it starts decreasing and stays relatively constant. Likewise,
the RMSE is much higher during crisis than non-crisis years. Figure 2 present the fit of the
estimation on a year by year basis. The fit is very close for all non-crisis years.
Our theory fits remarkably well the non-crisis years, but it has trouble fitting disagreement
and accuracy during the crisis. Disagreement in the data is higher compared to what the
model predicts. The theory predicts a higher RMSE compared to the data. However, the
estimates can help shed light on why this is the case: our theory assumed that agents “stick”
to their initial model. This is a bad idea during a turmoil since there is often a paradigm shift.
The sharp decrease in RMSE is the data during the crisis suggests that agents in our sample
discarded their “old” model for a new one and obtained a dramatic improvement in accuracy.
Our basic theory does not allow for such mid-year model-shifting. Our empirical estimates give
us a measure of agents ”faith” in their model. This is the parameter a18–the precision of the
prior model. Our estimates in Table 3 show that agents’ faith in their model drops from 321.78
for non-crisis years to 0.0001 in 2008! This provides significant empirical evidence that agents
lose faith in their models during turbulent years.
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Figure 7: Fit of baseline theory by subsamples. Disagreement and RMSE
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Table 3: Estimated Parameters, Baseline Theory
Parameters φ σv a18 µ σµ J Test
Samples
All years 0.9982 0.0042 333.31 2.091 0.6758 0.9969
(0.2016) (0.005) (0.00001) (1.0564) (0.0921)
Crisis 0.9983 0.024 8.5486 2.8623 0.7246 1.0000
(0.4943) (0.0669) (0.0001) (1.7153) (0.1942)
Non Crisis 0.9982 0.0036 321.78 1.836 0.6709 0.9991
(0.1328) (0.0035) (0.00001) (0.1547) (0.0654)
Years
2014 0.9166 0.0014 266.31 1.9987 0.5089 1.0000
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00005) (0.00006)
2013 0.9975 0.0061 365.53 1.019 0.4733 1.0000
(0.0669) (0.0004) (0.00001) (0.0772) (0.0275)
2012 0.9529 0.0052 361.27 1.8063 0.6454 1.0000
(0.0004) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00014) (0.00005)
2011 0.9416 0.0001 110.38 2.4316 1.031 1.0000
(0.0326) (0.091) (0.00001) (0.1676) (0.0296)
2010 0.9397 0.0074 198.38 1.2981 0.8562 1.0000
(0.00016) (0.00006) (0.00001) (0.00012) (0.00002)
2009 0.9991 0.0318 16.791 1.2151 1.3206 1.0000
(0.6589) (0.044) (0.00001) (0.4892) (1.2815)
2008 0.6058 0.2003 0.0001 2.7841 0.6379 0.9994
(1.861) (0.0167) (16.798) (0.0902) (0.0887)
2007 0.9978 0.0001 199.42 1.951 0.562 0.9949
(0.1051) (0.0353) (0.00001) (0.1057) (0.0185)
Notes: Estimated parameters of the baseline theory based on the Simulated Method of Moments,
matching accuracy and disagreement on average over the different sample of years and separately for
each year. The J-Test column shows the p-values of the test of over-identifying restrictions.
Our results give for each year an estimate of the distribution across agents of the long-run
mean of annual inflation implied by the agents’ models. We report this distribution in Figure
8 along with the actual realizations of annual inflation.
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The dots in Figure 8 represent the estimated long run mean of inflation (µ) averaged across
agents for each year. The grey boxes are the confidence intervals for the mean (computed as the
estimated mean plus/minus two times the estimated standard deviation across agents, σµ). The
red line represents the realizations of annual inflation for each year. In all years, the estimates
of µ are between 1% and 3% and actual inflation is always within the confidence intervals. The
higher uncertainty during the crisis is reflected in a wider confidence interval for 2009.
6 Are Agents Herding?
An important feature of the ECFC survey is that the most recently updated forecasts of other
agents, as well as the consensus forecast are visible to users of the Bloomberg terminal, and
thus are known to our agents when they decide to update. We leverage this feature to build a
variant of our theory that investigates whether forecast updates in our dataset are more plausi-
bly driven by herding than by the arrival of information in the form of monthly CPI release as
in the baseline case. The forecasts of others, as well as the consensus (the mean forecast), are
relevant for a forecaster, since they may include private as well as public information. Indeed,
consensus forecasts from various surveys have been documented to be remarkably accurate and
are often used in policy, and more generally, in economic decision-making.9
We model “herding” by assuming that the common signal zi,h = zh is the current month’s
9For instance, Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2007) document that forecasts from surveys of expectations are more
accurate than predictions based on macro variables or asset prices.
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Figure 9: Weekly updating frequencies for years 2013 (left) and 2014 (right)
consensus forecast, which is compatible with the finding that the consensus forecast in the
ECFC survey is an unbiased forecast of annual inflation (as shown in Table 2). Since there
are several days in a month when revisions could potentially take place, it is not clear a priori
when to measure the consensus forecast. However, one interesting pattern that emerges when
measuring the fraction of updaters at the weekly frequency (see Figure 9)10 is that almost all
updates in a month happen in a given week. Why is that? This may seem puzzling at first,
but after talking to the survey managers at Bloomberg, we found out that Bloomberg sends a
monthly email reminder to the survey participants asking them to update their forecast. The
reminder is usually sent sometime during the first ten days of the month, but the exact date
changes from month to month. This reminder provides a focal date for each month after which
most updates take place, and it motivates us to assume that almost all updaters in a month
have observed the consensus forecast on the day of the email reminder.
In the “herding” variation of our theory, we thus assume that the public signal zi,h = zh is
the current month’s consensus forecast measured on the day of Bloomberg’s email reminder.
As an empirical estimate of the signal’s precision we use the inverse of the variance of forecasts
across agents measured on the same day, which is also observable to the agents and is common
across agents bi,h = bh. Since the initial precision of the forecasts a18, is assumed to be constant
across agents, in the “herding” theory the weights on public information in (3) are homogeneous
across agents, as in the baseline version (recall equation (11)).
The parameters for the “herding” theory are θ = (λh, µ, σ
2
µ, a18). We compute the disagree-
ment and RMSE implied by the theory as in the baseline case. The forecast for the updaters
is obtained using equations (3)-(5) where zi,h = zh is now the consensus forecast measured on
the day of the Bloomberg email reminder in month h and bi,h is the inverse of the variance of
10Figure 4 depicts the fraction of updaters at the monthly frequency
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forecasts across agents measured on the same day. The forecast for the non-updaters equals
the previous month’s forecast. We present the fit of the herding theory in Figure 10. Table
4 further reports a summary measure of the relative fit of the “herding” theory compared to
the baseline theory (among other variations). Figure 10 and Table 4 show that the fit of the
“herding” theory is always sizeably worse than the fit of the baseline theory for both accuracy
and disagreement and for crisis and non-crisis years.
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Figure 10: Fit of herding theory. Disagreement and RMSE
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7 Importance of Different Ingredients of our Theory
As described in Section 4 our theory has three main features: i) inattention ii) heterogeneous
models and iii) Bayesian updating using a public signal that is either monthly CPI or the con-
sensus forecast. In order to evaluate the extent to which each feature is essential in matching
the patterns of accuracy and disagreement in the data, we estimate a number of variations of
our theory:
Homogeneous Model. All agents use the same model, so that σ2c = 0 in (7), which implies
that µi = µ, ∀i.
Full Attention. All agents update their forecasts, i.e. λh = 0 at all horizons h.
Baseline with Noise. Updaters observe a noisy signal of monthly CPI. So, instead of xh,
agents observe a signal si,h, where:
si,h = xh + ui,h (12)
ui,h ∼ N(0, σ2u) ∀i, h
E[ui,h, vτ ] = 0 ∀i, h, τ.
Since agents do not fully observe the actual realization of xh, they have to filter out the noise
to produce a forecast.
The model for xh remains as in equation (7) so we can write the model in space-state form
as: x˜h = φx˜h+1+vh and si,h = x˜h+ui,h, with x˜h = xh−ci/(1−φ). Agents compute the optimal
estimate of the unobserved monthly CPI at each horizon h using the Kalman filter: Letting
x̂i,h|h ≡ E[x˜h|si,h, si,h+1, ...] and Pi,h|h ≡ V ar[x˜h|si,h, si,h+1, ...], we have:
x̂i,h|h = x̂i,h|h+1 + Pi,h|h+1(Pi,h|h+1 + σ2u)
−1(si,h − x̂i,h|h+1)
Pi,h|h = Pi,h|h+1 − Pi,h|h+1(Pi,h|h+1 + σ2u)−1Pi,h|h+1,
where x̂i,h|h+1 = φx̂i,h+1|h+1 and Pi,h|h+1 = φ2Pi,h+1|h+1 + σ2v . In this version of the theory there
are therefore two sources of heterogeneity: agents observe different signals and they interpret
them according to different models. Relative to the baseline theory, the public signal (previously
described by (8) and (9)) is now ẑi,h:
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ẑi,h = µi +
φh−11(1− φ12)
1− φ x̂i,h|h for h = 17, . . . , 12 (13)
ẑi,h =
h+ 1
12
µi +
φ(1− φh)
1− φ x̂i,h|h + x̂i,h|h +
11∑
j=h+1
xj for h = 11, . . . , 1. (14)
For numerical stability we initialize the Kalman filter 150 months before the 18 months fore-
cast horizon and set the initial forecast and variance for agent i to x̂i,167|168 = φ(x168−ci/(1−φ))
and Pi,167|168 = σ2v/(1−φ2), so that there is no noise at the initial month and the initial variance
is the unconditional variance of x˜h. This implies that the filter’s accuracy is constant across
agents, Pi,h|h = Ph|h.
The signal’s precision is as before given by the inverse of the forecast error i,h = y − ẑi,h:
E[2i,h] =
φ2h−22(1− φ12)2
(1− φ)2 Ph|h + σ
2
v
11∑
j=0
(1− φj+1)2
(1− φ)2 + σ
2
v
h−1∑
j=12
φ2j−22(1− φ12)2
(1− φ)2 , h ≥ 12(15)
=
(
1− φh+1
1− φ
)2
Ph|h + σ2v
h−1∑
j=0
1− φj+1
1− φ , h ≤ 11. (16)
Now the signal’s precision b̂−1h = E[
2
i,h] is not only a function of the unforecastable part of y,
but it also depends on the accuracy of the filter Ph|h.11 The fact that the precision is constant
across agents implies that all agents attach the same weight to the public signal. Specifically,
bh is now replaced by b̂h and the weights are as in equation (11).
Baseline with Data-Driven Weights. In this variation of the baseline theory we replace
the Bayesian weights with the data-driven weights used in Patton and Timmermann (2010):
wh = 1−
E[e2i,h]
κ2 + E[e2i,h]
,
where ei,h ≡ y−zi,h and E[.] is the average across agents. The parameter κ corresponds to a pa-
rameter that governs the degree of shrinkage. Note that, since y represents the actual inflation
rate, the weights are an ex-post measure of the precision of the public signal zi,h. Therefore, by
construction, more accurate public information implies a higher weight attached to the public
signal.
11The second part of the expression for E[2i,h] is the same as in the baseline model.
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Figure 11: Estimated Weights: Baseline (Bayesian) and Data-Driven Weights
Structural Estimation: To estimate these alternative specifications we follow a procedure
analogous to the one used to estimate the baseline we a number of small modifications. We
seek to estimate the following parameters θ = (λh, φ, σ
2
v , µ, σ
2
µ, a18).
When simulating the “homogeneous models” version of the theory we assume that there
is a common µi ≡ µ for all agents, so all agents have the same first forecast and there is no
disagreement at h = 18. For the “full attention” version of the theory everything is as in the
baseline case apart from the fact that there is no inattention so λh = 0. When simulating the
“baseline with noise”, we follow the same procedure as in the baseline theory but now the
updaters rely on the public signals (13) and (14) while the weights depend on the overall signal’s
precision given by (15) and (16). This version of the theory has an additional parameter σ2u. For
the “baseline with data-driven weights”, the weights are computed using the actual real-
izations of annual inflation and κ is an additional parameter to estimate. In Appendix C.1 we
present all results graphically by plotting the theoretical and empirical RMSE and disagreement.
Table 4 compares the fit of a number of variations of the baseline theory, with positive
numbers denoting the percentage deterioration in fit. These results highlight the role of each
of the key ingredients of the theory in fitting the data. The fit of the “Herding” theory is worse
than our baseline (by 72% for disagreement and 52% for accuracy), so monthly CPI fits the
data better. Heterogeneity in models is a crucial aspect of our theory, as eliminating this source
of heterogeneity would worsen the fit over all years by 156% for disagreement and by 4% for
accuracy. In contrast, eliminating inattention worsens the fit by 37% for disagreement and by
15% for accuracy. Adding noise to the Baseline model worsens the fit by 0.9% for disagreement
and 117% for accuracy. As expected, data-driven weights always improve the fit of accuracy,
however Bayes’ rule outperforms these data-driven weights in matching disagreement in non-
crisis years! In Figure 11, we further report the estimated data-driven weights, and we can see
that the Bayesian weights assumed by our baseline theory are relatively close to the data-driven
weights for all years and, in particular, for the non-crisis years. These findings provide empirical
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Table 4: Relative Fit (%), Nested Models
All years Crisis Non Crisis
Models Disag Accuracy Disag Accuracy Disag Accuracy
Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0
Herding 72.6 52.3 1.1 53.1 97.9 43.7
Homogeneous Models 156.2 4.1 71.8 -11.8 346.6 31.6
Full Attention 37.8 15.1 26.7 20.3 89 4.5
Baseline with Noise 0.9 117.5 -23.4 80.9 51.9 40.2
Baseline with data-driven Weights -39.2 -44.8 -19.2 -49.6 12.04 -43.8
Notes: The table reports the relative fit (%) of the alternative theories and the baseline theory. The fit
of theory j is measured by the cumulative absolute deviation between theoretical and empirical moments:
CAEj =
∑H
h=1 |yh(θ) − yh| where yh(θ) is the theoretical disagreement or accuracy at horizon h and yh its
empirical counterpart. The relative fit is the percentage change of CAEj with respect to the baseline theory
CAEb: (CAEj −CAEb)/CAEb. Hence, a positive (negative) entry indicates an inferior (superior) fit of theory
j with respect to the baseline theory.
evidence in support of Ortoleva (2012)’s theory where decision-makers employ Bayes’ rule in
normal times but behave differently when they face “rare” events.
8 Comparison with Leading Alternative Theories
How does our theory fare compared to leading theories of expectation updating with informa-
tion rigidities? To evaluate the relative performance we estimate these theories using the same
methodology as that used to estimate our theory and compare their relative fit. We first briefly
summarize the alternative theories we consider. Then, in Section 5 we estimate and compare
the relative fit of these with our theory.
8.1 Leading Theories of Expectation Updates
Sticky Information. Originally proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), this theory involves
inattentive agents that update their information set at infrequent times. In contrast with our
theory, all agents have the same model and updaters assign weight 1 to the public signal. In
other words, forecast updates are:
ŷi,h =
{
zh if i ∈ Ih
ŷi,h+1 otherwise,
(17)
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where Ih is the set of updaters at time h and zh the public signal about annual inflation as in
equations (8) and (9). There is no heterogeneity in models ci = c, which implies no disagreement
among updaters.
Noisy Information. This theory is based on Sims (2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt
(2009), and it assumes that all agents are constantly tracking new information, (i.e. “no
inattention”) but they observe a noisy signal as in equation (12) and use the Kalman filter
to extract the information. Agents have homogeneous models so: ci = c, ∀i. Then, at each
horizon h = 18 . . . , 1, agent’s i forecast is equal to filtered public signal given by (13) and (14).12
Sticky-Noisy Theory. As originally stressed by Andrade and Le Bihan (2013), the pres-
ence of both inattention and disagreement within updaters could be reconciled by allowing
for a hybrid Sticky-Noisy theory. In this theory, a fraction 1 − λh of agents observe a noisy
public signal. Those who update their forecasts do so in the same way described in the “Noisy
Information” theory.
Patton and Timmermann’s Theory. The theory in Patton and Timmermann (2010)
allows for disagreement in long run means, but assumes that all agents are attentive and there
is noise in the public signal. This theory assumes that agent i’s forecast at horizon h is given
by a weighted average between the optimal forecast extracted from the Kalman Filter and the
heterogenous long run means, µi, as follows:
ŷi,h = whµi + (1− wh)E[y|si,h] (18)
wh =
E[e2ih]
κ2 + E[e2ih]
(19)
eih ≡ y − E[y|si,h]. (20)
In contrast to our theory, in Patton and Timmermann (2010) the weights (wh =
E[e2ih]
κ2+E[e2ih]
)
are not Bayesian and are given by an ad-hoc specification chosen to match the data. The
assumed function for the weights has the property that as the filtered signal E[y|si,h] becomes
more accurate, the weight attached to the forecast increases. As before, κ is a free parameter,
estimated to determine the degree of shrinkage.
Table 5 summarizes the key features of each of the aforementioned theories:
8.2 Alternative Theories: Fit Comparisons
Here we compare the fit of the alternative theories with our new data. To do so, we estimate
them using the procedure described in Section 5. All the non-nested specifications, except
12Since the Noisy Information model does not assume a specific initial forecast (as in the baseline model), the
expression for ẑi,h holds even at h = 18.
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Table 5: Alternative Theories
Het. Bayes Signal: Signal:
Models Models Inattention Rule Monthly CPI Consensus Noisy Info
Baseline X X X X
Herding X X X X
Homogeneous Models X X X
Full attention X X X
Baseline with Noise X X X X X
Sticky Info.( MR 2002) X X
Noisy Info. (CG 2012) X X
Sticky - Noisy (AL 2013) X X X
PT 2010 X X X
for Patton and Timmermann’s theory, assume homogeneous models across agents, i.e. µi ≡ µ.
Hence, except for this latter case, the distribution of models is again degenerate. For the “sticky
information” model, the updating rule is given by (17) using the same random mechanism to
determine the updaters as described in in Section 5. Since this theory implies no disagreement
within updaters and at h = 18 every agent has to provide a forecast, we have zero disagreement
at the beginning of the horizon. In the “noisy information” theory (and all the remaining
theories) there is full attention, so every agent updates their forecast based on (13) and (14)
with constant µ. Although the theory assumes homogeneous models, the noisy signal induces
disagreement (12). The simulation for the “sticky noisy” model is simply a combination of
the two previous procedures, where we replace zh on equation (17) by ẑh as given by (13) and
(14). Finally, for “Patton and Timmermann’s” theory we first draw different µi as before
and then let agents update their forecasts as (18) - (20), where E(y|si,h) = ẑh is again given by
(13) and (14).13
Table 6 summarizes the results about their relative performance. For non-crisis years the fit
of our theory is significantly better than that of the “sticky information” model (that model’s
fit is worse by 581.6% for disagreement and 162.3% for accuracy), of the noisy information
model (that model’s fit is worse by 117.4% for disagreement and 12.7% for accuracy), of the
“sticky-noisy” model (that model’s fit is worse by 61.8% for disagreement and 35.1% for ac-
curacy) and of Patton and Timmermann (2010)’s “long-run means” model (that model’s fit is
worse by 114.5% for disagreement and 30.9% for accuracy).
For the crisis years, the fit of our model remains better apart from two instances: The
13Recall that although (13) starts from h = 17, this equation also holds for h = 18. This is because none of
the alternative theories makes assumptions about the initial forecast.
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Table 6: Relative Fit (%), Alternative Theories
Crisis Non Crisis
Disagreement Accuracy Disagreement Accuracy
Sticky Info 64.8 15.6 581.6 162.3
Noisy Info 5 6.2 117.4 12.7
Sticky Noisy -21.6 -14.8 61.8 35.1
PT 2010 -38.7 -40.6 114.5 30.9
The table reports the relative fit (%) of the alternative theories and the baseline theory. The fit of theory
j is measured by the cumulative absolute deviation between theoretical and empirical moments: CAEj =∑H
h=1 |yh(θ) − yh| where yh(θ) is the theoretical disagreement or accuracy at horizon h and yh its empirical
counterpart. The relative fit is the percentage change of CAEj with respect to the baseline theory CAEb:
(CAEj − CAEb)/CAEb. Hence, a positive (negative) entry indicates an inferior (superior) fit of theory j with
respect to the baseline theory.
“sticky-noisy” model fits disagreement and accuracy better (our model is worse by 21.6% and
14.8%, respectively). The reason for this is that, in our theory, what drives the disagreement
is the heterogeneous but time-invariant models of agents. In Andrade and Le Bihan (2013)’s
“sticky-noisy” model disagreement is driven by the noise in the information which is time-
variant and changes from crises to non-crises years. Coming to the second instance, Patton
and Timmermann (2010)’s “long-run means” model fits better than ours in both accuracy and
disagreement (our model is worse by 38.7% and by 40.6% respectively). The key difference
between our baseline and Patton and Timmermann (2010)’s approach is that they assume that
agents assign ad-hoc (data-driven) weights to information and to their previous forecast, so
agents in their model do not follow Bayes’ rule. This difference in fit suggests that Bayesian
updating fits remarkably well in “normal times,” while not that well during the crisis when,
perhaps, agents do not have adequate estimates about the precision of their information nor of
their model. Remarkably, as we already noted, our model with Bayesian updating fits better
than Patton and Timmermann (2010)’s model both accuracy and disagreement during non-
crisis years despite the fact that they choose the weights on information to ex-post rationalize
the data.
Summing up, the structural estimation of our theory, as well as the aforementioned fit
comparisons with alternative theories support the following consistent message: In normal
times, agents use heterogeneous models to which they attach high faith, and, when updating,
they incorporate information directly linked to the forecasted variable using Bayes’ rule. During
crises agents lose faith in their model, and become uncertain about how to interpret new
information.
31
9 Conclusions
Expectations are a key determinant of economic decisions. How economic agents form expecta-
tions is a key building block of macro and finance models and the increasing role of expectation
manipulation in monetary policy makes it important not only to understand how expectations
are formed and how they evolve over time, but also how they respond to communication of
public information. A large literature in macroeconomics studies stochastic dynamics systems
in order to predict the dynamic evolution of macroeconomic variables such as consumption,
income and investment. Our paper shows that information rigidities and heterogeneous models
are key elements of any theory of expectation formation that can explain the dynamic patterns
of accuracy and disagreement observed in surveys of professional forecasters. Our theory is
simple, assumes rational learning and it empirically outperforms most leading theories of in-
formation rigidities. Due to its simplicity it can be incorporated in larger economic theories
studying phenomena that depend on the dynamics of expectation formation. It would be inter-
esting to evaluate in the future whether such models with more “micro-founded” expectations
processes have enhanced explanatory power.
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A Baseline Model Derivations
Optimal Forecast: We derive the conditional mean of annual inflation at different horizons h.
The forecasted variable y is approximately equal to the last twelve realizations of xh:
y =
11∑
h=0
xh.
Since xh = ci + φxh+1 + vh, the unconditional mean of xh is µ˜i≡ ci1−φ and:
x0 = µ˜i + φ
12(x12 − µ˜i) +
11∑
j=0
φjvj
x1 = µ˜i + φ
11(x12 − µ˜i) +
10∑
j=0
φjvj+1
. . .
x11 = µ˜i + φ(x12 − µ˜i) + v11,
which implies
y = 12µ˜i +
φ(1− φ12)
1− φ (x12 − µ˜i) +
11∑
j=0
1− φj+1
1− φ vj.
At horizon h ≥ 12 we have:
y = 12µ˜i +
φh−11(1− φ12)
1− φ (xh − µ˜i) +
11∑
j=0
1− φj+1
1− φ vj +
h−1∑
j=12
φj−11(1− φ12)
1− φ vj. (21)
Within the target year 11 - h realizations of xh are observed. Hence, for h ≤ 11:
y = hµ˜i +
φ(1− φh)
1− φ (xh − µ˜i) +
11∑
j=h
xj +
h+1∑
j=0
1− φj+1
1− φ vj. (22)
The optimal forecast for the annual inflation rate at horizon h ≥ 12 and h ≤ 11 is equal to the
conditional expectation of equations (21) and (22) respectively, i.e. zi,h = E[yt|xh, xh+1, . . . ].
Given the definition for µi we obtain equations (8) and (9).
Signal’s Precision: Agents evaluate the signal’s precision trough the lens of their models.
Given the signal zi,h = y + εi,h and the expressions for y and zi,h the variance of the forecast
error at horizon h ≥ 12 is derived as follows:
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εi,h = y − zi,h
=
11∑
j=0
1− φj+1
1− φ vj +
h−1∑
j=12
φj−11(1− φ12)
1− φ vj
E[ε2i,h] = σ
2
v
11∑
j=0
(1− φj+1)2
(1− φ)2 + σ
2
v
h−1∑
j=12
φ2j−22(1− φ12)2
(1− φ)2 .
The first expression on the right hand side of the previous equation is:
σ2v
11∑
j=0
(1− φj+1)2
(1− φ)2 =
σ2v
(1− φ)2
11∑
j=0
(1− φj+1)2
=
σ2v
(1− φ)2 [(1− φ)
2 + (1− φ2)2 + · · ·+ (1− φ12)2]
=
σ2v
(1− φ)2 [12− 2(φ+ φ
2 + · · ·+ φ12) + (φ2 + φ4 + · · ·+ φ24)]
=
σ2v
(1− φ)2
[
12− 2φ(1− φ
12)
1− φ +
φ2(1− φ24)
1− φ2
]
.
The second expression is:
σ2v
h−1∑
j=12
φ2j−22(1− φ12)2
(1− φ)2 = σ
2
v
(1− φ12)2
(1− φ)2
h−1∑
j=12
φ2j−22
= σ2v
(1− φ12)2
(1− φ)2 (φ
2 + φ4 + · · ·+ φ2h−2−22)
= σ2v
(1− φ12)2
(1− φ)2
φ2(1− φ2h−24)
1− φ2
= σ2v
φ2(1− φ12)2(1− φ2h−24)
(1− φ)3(1 + φ) .
Summing the two expressions we obtain the expression for b−1h for h ≥ 12, while relying on the
same derivation as in the first equation, we get the expression for h ≤ 11.
Baseline with Noise: The variance of the forecast error for h ≥ 12 is:
i,h = y − zi,h
=
φh−11(1− φ12)
1− φ (xh − x̂i,h) +
11∑
j=0
1− φj+1
1− φ vj +
h−1∑
j=12
φj−11(1− φ12)
1− φ vj
E[2i,h] =
φ2h−22(1− φ12)2
(1− φ)2 E(xh − x̂i,h)
2 + σ2v
11∑
j=0
(1− φj+1)2
(1− φ)2 + σ
2
v
h−1∑
j=12
φ2j−22(1− φ12)2
(1− φ)2 .
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The last two expressions on the right hand side of E[2i,h] are the same as in the baseline
case. The same argument can be used for h ≤ 11:
i,h =
(
φ(1− φh)
1− φ + 1
)
(xh − x̂i,h) +
h+1∑
j=0
1− φj+1
1− φ vj
E[2i,h] =
(
1− φh+1
1− φ
)2
E(xh − x̂i,h)2 + σ2v
11∑
j=0
(1− φj+1)2
(1− φ)2 .
Hence, the variance of the forecast error also depends on Pi,h|h ≡ E(xh − x̂i,h)2 which is
the mean squared error of the Kalman Filter. All agents solve the same recursion based on
the same parameters, so that Pih =Ph. Hence, these two expressions above give the signal’s
precision in the baseline model with noise b̂−1h .
B Estimation Procedure
The SMM estimation solves:
Min
θ̂
Gh(θ)
′WtGh(θ), (23)
where
Gh(θ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
mt,h − 1
τT
τT∑
t=1
mt,h(θ)
and where the observed accuracy and disagreement for different years t and horizons h are
collected in mt,h while their simulated theoretical counterparts are collected in mt,h(θ).
Here Gh(θ) is a q × 1 vector of moments, and Wt corresponds to a q × q positive definite
weighting matrix. We let Wt equal the identity matrix, so we assign the same weight to all
moments. The asymptotic distribution of the SMM estimator when T →∞ is
√
T (θ̂ − θ)→ N(0, (1 + 1/τ)(D′W−1D)−1), (24)
where D = E(∂mt,h(θ)/∂θ) is the Jacobian evaluated at θ̂ and W corresponds to the
optimal weighting matrix. Based on (24), we obtain the standard deviation of the estimated
parameters by computing the variance and covariance matrix of the moments Gh(θ) given
the estimated parameters, Ŵt. Additionally, based on this matrix the test of over-identifying
restrictions (J-test) is given by:
T (1 + 1/τ)Gh(θ̂)
′
ŴtGh(θ̂) ∼ χ2q−p. (25)
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Figure 12: Homogeneous Models: Disagreement and Accuracy
C Further Empirical Results
We report graphically the fit the variants of the baseline theory and of the alternative theories
discussed in Section 8. The RMSE and disagreement from the data are computed as averages
over all years and separately for crisis and non-crisis years. We estimate each of the theories to
fit the data on average and we perform separate estimations for crisis and non-crisis years. For
the variation of the baseline theory with data-driven weights we further report the estimated
weights compared to the Bayesian weights.
C.1 The Fit of Variations of Baseline Theory
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Figure 13: Full Attention: Disagreement and Accuracy
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Figure 14: Baseline with Noise: Disagreement and Accuracy
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Figure 15: Data-Driven Weights: Disagreement and Accuracy
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C.2 The Fit of Alternative Theories
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Figure 16: Sticky Information: Disagreement and Accuracy
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Figure 17: Noisy Information: Disagreement and Accuracy
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Figure 18: Sticky Noisy: Disagreement and Accuracy
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